At its heart, Jaishankar’s thesis tackled a central dilemma of the Cold War era: could the superpower logic of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) be applied to a regional context like South Asia? He argued that it could not be transplanted directly. Unlike the US-USSR dyad, which was characterized by geographical distance and ideological parity, the India-Pakistan-China triangle was marked by proximity, asymmetry in conventional forces, and low-intensity conflict. Jaishankar posited that deterrence in this “regional context” was inherently more fragile and crisis-prone. He introduced the concept of a "minimum credible deterrent"—not as a static arsenal, but as a dynamic political tool designed to prevent escalation while preserving space for diplomacy. This was a distinctly Indian realist argument: nuclear weapons were not instruments of war-winning, but of war-prevention in a hostile neighborhood.
From Nuclear Deterrence to Civilian Diplomacy: The Enduring Relevance of S. Jaishankar’s Doctoral Thesis s jaishankar phd thesis
Before Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar became India’s most recognizable and assertive External Affairs Minister, before he navigated the complexities of the Indo-Pacific and the post-Ukraine war world order, he was a scholar. His PhD thesis, titled “Deterrence in Regional Contexts: Nuclear India and Its Challenges,” completed at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in the late 1980s, serves not merely as an academic credential but as the foundational blueprint of his strategic worldview. The thesis offers a critical lens to understand his later diplomatic actions, particularly his emphasis on pragmatic realism, multi-alignment, and the nuanced management of nuclear-armed adversaries. This essay argues that Jaishankar’s PhD thesis was a prescient work that moved beyond abstract nuclear theory to ground deterrence in the specific, volatile realities of South Asia, thereby shaping the core tenets of his contemporary foreign policy. At its heart, Jaishankar’s thesis tackled a central
Critics might argue that the thesis, written before India’s 1998 nuclear tests (Pokhran-II), is now dated. They contend that the rise of non-state actors, cyber warfare, and hypersonic missiles have fundamentally altered deterrence. However, Jaishankar’s work anticipated this: his focus on “regional contexts” includes non-military dimensions of power. In his recent speeches, he often reiterates that deterrence today is not just about warheads but about economic resilience (supply chains), technological dominance (5G, space), and diplomatic networking. Thus, the thesis’s core insight—that deterrence is a holistic statecraft—remains more relevant than ever. His handling of the COVID-era border standoff with China, combining military vigilance with a refusal to decouple economically, perfectly illustrates this thesis-driven pragmatism. From Nuclear Deterrence to Civilian Diplomacy: The Enduring